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THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIVES OF PRESIDENTS 
Neal Kumar Katyalo 
Focusing on afrequent theme in the executive privilege arguments advanced 
by the Clinton Administration, Neal Kumar Katyal explores the distinction drawn 
between the public and private lives of the President, particularly in the Paula. 
Jones and Monica Lewinsky cases. He argues that the Administration's difficulties 
in asserting executive privilege claims following these cases demonstrate that the 
public/private distinction is not entirely valid He asserts that, unlike members of 
Congress who have time when they are not in session, the President is unique in 
that he is office twenty-four hours a day. He argues that this special constitutional 
status puts pressure on the public and private distinction. Professor Katyal 
maintains that presidents have only a limited reservoir of secrecy from which to 
draw. Thus, the use of privilege on private mailers such as the Lewinsky 
.investigation not only weakens their ability to claim executive privilege on 
significant public mailers but it also adversely affects their ability to achieve their 
political ends. 
• • • 
"It's nobody's business but ours. Even presidents have private lives. It 
is time to stop the pursuit of personal destruction and the prying into 
private lives and get on with our national life." 
President William Jefferson Clinton, 
Aug. 17,19981 
INTRODUCTION 
A recursive feature of the Clinton cases has been an argument based on the 
distinction between the public and private life of the President of the United States. 
In the first of these cases, the sexual harassment suit brought by Paula Jones, the 
President contended that the distraction of suits arising from his private life would 
encumber the Presidency, and ultimately harm the people whom he represents. Unlike 
a lawsuit to stop a president's arguably unconstitutional acts-such as seizing the 
• Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
I Text o/Clinton's Address to Nation, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1998, at AI4 [hereinafter 
Clinton's Address]. 
677 
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steel miIls,2 using the line-item veto,3 or launching military operations in 
Kosov04--Clinton argued that this type oflawsuit could wait. The Supreme Court, 
as we now know, rejected such a difference. Instead, it drew an analogy between the 
official act cases and cases for private damages, and held that the President must 
answer Jones' lawsuit like every other citizen.' 
Then the world learned of Monica Lewinsky. The President invoked executive 
privilege to shield two of his aides from Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's 
subpoenas to the grand jury.6 Starr drew upon the personaVpublic distinction in 
contesting the President's assertions of privilege, arguing that the President could not 
use executive privilege in an investigation into his personal conduct.' The court 
found the testimony of the President's aides to concern official acts, but held that 
executive privilege was trumped by the need for the evidence.8 
Following a referral from Mr. Starr, Congress began impeachment proceedings, 
and Clinton became the first duly elected President in our nation's history to be 
impeached. Using the familiar words that private activities should not be a basis on 
which to remove a President, Clinton argued that his liaisons with Ms. Lewinsky 
concerned only his private, not his public, life. Clinton's lawyers contended that an 
impeachable offense required an offense against the state, and a semi-sexual 
relationship with an intern did not constitute such an offense. 
This Essay suggests that the public/private distinction was not nearly as strong 
an argument as many have assumed. The President is unique, for he is the only 
official in office twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.9 This special 
constitutional status puts pressure on the distinction between public and private, for 
unlike members of Congress (whom the Constitution presumes will be away from 
office at regular intervals) presidents are always "in session."'o The President has, 
constitutionally speaking, virtually no personal life while in office. In particular, and 
in keeping with the theme of this Symposium, this Essay looks to executive privilege 
to demonstrate that a President's private acts can have public consequences. A brief 
glance at President Clinton's difficulty in asserting executive privilege in the wake of 
2 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
3 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
4 See Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999). 
~ See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703-04 (1997). 
6 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings,S F. Supp. 2d 21,24-25 (D.D.C. 1998), affd in 
part, rev'd in part sub nom, In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C.Cir. Jul 27, 1998), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 996 (1998). 
7 See id at 25. 
8 See id 
9 See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges & Immunities: 
The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REv. 701, 713 (1995). 
10 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (providing immunity from arrest for members of Congress 
only while they are "at session"). 
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his impeachment-and in particular in the F ALN matter-<iemonstrates the point. 
The President's assertion of privilege during the Lewinsky investigation adversely 
affected his ability to assert privilege in subsequent cases. The connection occurs 
because there is a limited reservoir of secrecy from which the President may draw, 
and by squandering this resource during the Lewinsky investigation, President Clinton 
could not deploy it elsewhere in cases where the need for privilege may have been 
more significant. In making this point, I do not mean to suggest that the President 
should,have been impeached (indeed, there were many reasons why he should not 
have been). I am simply saying that the reason not to impeach him cannot be that his 
activities were private and therefore had no impact on the state. II 
Just as it should be presumed that the demands on the President's time are such 
that any private lawsuit will have public consequences, so too should it be assumed 
that negative public consequences may follow when the President engages in wrongful 
personal acts. Some consequences will be political, such as the President's inability 
to pass legislation he favors. 12 Other consequences will be legal, such as the natural 
impetus to stretch the law of privilege to protect on~self. In either case, however, the 
personal acts of the President have a dramatic effect on the public life of the nation. 
I. THE PAULA JONES CASE 
In one of the rare instances of a private civil suit being brought against a sitting 
President, Paula Jones alleged that President Clinton, while Governor of Arkansas, 
violated her constitutional rights by making improper sexual advances toward her.13 
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the President's lawyers filed a motion seeking 
temporary immunity, arguing that his weighty duties as Head of State precluded him 
from defending himself in court while in office. 14 According to the President's 
lawyers, "Even if a President ultimately prevails, protracted personal damages 
litigation would make it impossible for him to devote his undivided energies to one of 
the most demanding jobs in the world .... The President's litigation ... like the 
President's illness, becomes the nation's problem."ls The President's lawyers 
II This Essay puts to one side the argument, advanced by the House Managers, that 
President Clinton committed a crime, or a series of crimes, and that such acts are, by 
definition, not private. This Essay does so not only to simplify discussion, but also because 
many technical elements necessary for a crime-such as perjury's requirement of 
materiality-appear to be lacking in the case. 
12 The Tobacco Bill is one example. See Susan Page, A Year into Scandal. Damage is 
Done, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 1999, at lA, available in 1999 WL 6831607. 
13 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 685 (1997). 
14 See id at 686. 
IS Brief of Petitioner William Jefferson Clinton at 8, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 
(1997) (No. 95-1853). 
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dismissed analogies to official acts in which the President was held to be a proper 
defendant. 16 
The Supreme Court disagreed. It found that the historical support cited by both 
the President and Jones was weak and that quotes from the founding era '''largely 
cancel each other. ",17 The Court reasoned that,just as the President was not immune 
from suits brought in his official capacity, such as when President Truman tried to 
seize the steel mills, he should not be immune from suit brought in his private 
capacity either: 
The fact that a federal court's exercise of its traditional Article III 
jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief 
Executive is not sufficientto establish a violation ofthe Constitution. Two 
long-settled propositions, first announced by Chief Justice Marshall, support 
that conclusion. 
First, we have long held that when the President takes official action, the 
Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted within the law. 
Perhaps the most dramatic, example of such a case is our holding that 
President Truman exceeded his constitutional authority when he issued an 
order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate 
most of the Nation's steel mills in order to avert a national catastrophe. 
Despite the serious impact of that decision on the ability of the Executive 
Branch to accomplish its assigned mission, and the substantial time that the 
President must necessarily have devoted to the matter as a result of judicial 
involvement, we exercised our Article III jurisdiction to decide whether his 
official conduct conformed to the law .... 
Second, it is also settled that the President is subject to judicial process 
in appropriate circumstances .... 
If the Judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing 
the legality of the President's official conduct, and if it may direct 
appropriate process to the President himself, it must follow that the federal 
courts have power to determine the legality of his unofficial conduct. 18 
This congruence between public and private conduct provided precedent for the Court 
to say that Clinton must answer the lawsuit like any other litigant. 19 This precedent 
also led the Court to reject the notion that the President's personal business would 
16 See id at 19. 
17 Jones, 520 U.S. at 697 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579,634-35 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring». 
18 Id at 703, 705 (citations omitted). 
19 See id at 695. 
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become the nation's business.2o Instead, the Court professed faith in the ability of 
federal courts to wield summary judgment as a weapon to dismiss frivolous 
lawsuits.21 
In short, the Supreme Court rejected the President~ s claim that lawsuits based on 
his pre-office personal conduct should be postponed until he leaves office. The Court 
stated that it was "unlikely that a deluge of such litigation will ever engulf the 
Presidency. ,,22 
II. IMPEACHMENT 
A. The Relationship to the Paula Jones Privacy Principle 
The world was about to learn just how much the President's personal business 
could consume the nation. When Monica Lewinsky's name began to hit the airwaves, 
commentators thought the President would simply resign.2J Instead, Clinton mounted 
an aggressive legal and political defense. Part of Clinton 's defense was based on the 
notion that his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky was purely private behavior, and that it 
had no consequences upon his ability to govern.24 Pundits have criticized" the 
Supreme Court's opinion in the Jones case," and I, for one, agree with these 
criticisms.2s Yet, it must be said that the President's claim in Jones, that defending 
against a private sexual harassment lawsuit will take time away from doing the 
nation's business,26" applied afortiori to his activities in the wake of the Lewinsky 
matter. If we are supposed to fear the time a simple lawsuit takes away from the 
President and its ability to undo the entire executive branch, why should we not fear 
at least as much a President whose conduct risks massive public disapproval and 
embarrassment and whose attention is consumed for ail entire year by the publicity 
and proceedings against him? One must askwhetherthat, at the very least, is equally 
destructive to our system of government-in terms of taking away the President's 
time, attention, and good reputation. " 
A response to concerns about the impact of the President's private acts on his 
public duties mightgo something like this: The issue the President feared in the Paula 
Jones case was his amenability to be sued by any actor, at any time or place. If any 
20 See id" at 694. 
21 See id at 708-09. 
22 [d. at 702. 
23 See, e.g., This Week (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 25, 1998), available in 1998 WL 
6392249 (Sam Donaldson stating "[1]( [the president is] not telling the truth and the 
evidence shows that, [he] will resign, perhaps this week!') 
24 See Jones, 520 U.S. at 692-93. 
25 See Amar & Katyal, supra note 9; Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 
STAN. L. REv. 1709, 1754-57 (1998). 
26 See Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1361 (1996). 
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plaintiff could command the President's attention and resources, the nation's business 
would be stymied. Furthermore, because Paula Jones and other private plaintiffs are 
not elected officials, there is no accountability for their actions. The public cannot 
vote them out of office. Yet in the Lewinsky matter, accountability at all points rests 
on the President. The President decided to engage in the conduct. The President also 
decided to devote attention and resources to fighting the accusations. He gets to call 
the shots in this political, as opposed to legal, proceeding. And he can be held 
accountable for the choices he has made . 
. The problem with such a defense is that thePresident often did not get to control 
the proceedings. The most obvious example of this is impeachment, when he and 
much of his senior staff devoted their time and energy to fighting the accusation and 
charges. Even if the Congress could be held accountable for its impeachment 
decisions, the criminal investigation into the President's possible wrongdoing, and the 
testimony he gave to Ken Starr, was time spent in ways beyond his control. Even the 
press reports, and much else, demanded the President's time and attention in ways 
that he could not contain.27 All of this is foreseeable, and inevitable, when we are 
talking about potential wrongdoing by the President of the United States. 
Perhaps a separate answer could be that the proceedings and publicity against 
him were themselves unfair and unreasonable because they invaded his privacy. 
Were there an effective privacy defense, then the President would not have had to 
spend the time fending off the charges. Do not blame the President, the argument 
continues, for a zealous prosecution and publicity barrage that ignored his rights. If 
only the President had a zone of privacy, he would never have been subjected to this 
grizzly attack on his character and time. 
This kind of argument is surely weak. Any modern-day President, and certainly 
this President, had to expect that the zone of privacy from the press and opposing 
party is minimal at best.28 Even more importantly, we should recognize the tones of 
similarity between this argument and one we heard earlier, namely one that the 
President rejected in Jones. You will recall that Paula Jones claimed that temporary 
immunity was not necessary because district courts had the ability to dismiss 
frivolous lawsuits, and that the President would have the full range of rights and 
privileges, including summary dismissal.29 The President, however, was not 
27 It could be said that the fault here rests with those who stretched the impeachment 
proceedings out for a year and that the public could vote out the members of Congress 
responsible for this delay. Leaving aside the fact that lengthy proceedings were a reasonable 
and foreseeable consequence of an investigation that suggested wrongdoing by our nation's 
highest official, accountability in the particular case was skewed because the members of 
Congress who impeached the President were themselves members ofa lame-duck Congress. 
28 See, e.g., Robert Goldberg, MTV's Answer to Barbara Walters, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 
1995, at AIO (discussing President Clinton'S answer to the question of whether he wears 
boxers or briefs). 
29 See Brief of Respondent Paula Corbin Jones, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) 
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persuaded and argued that the potential for any given suitto go beyond the summary 
judgment stage was far too damning.3D One should wonder why faith in paper 
defenses should be vested in one arena, and not the other. Why is the potential for 
those in charge-whether the media or the Congress-to ignore the President' s 
privacy defense not enough to say that the President knowingly risked undermining 
his ability to govern? Indeed, the President at one point seems to acknowledge the 
inconsistency. As the epigraph to this Essay shows, in his address to the nation on 
August 17, 1998, he claimed that the matter was entirely private.31 Yet, his next 
words are telling: "Our country has been distracted by this matter for too long, and 
I take my responsibility for my part in all of this. That is all I can do."n 
It could also be said, in the wake of a strong economy and other indicia, that the 
President never lost his ability to govern. This statement may ultimately be right. If 
so, whether the President is able to govern is the question impeachment should tum 
on, and not whether the President's activities were private. The privacy defense was 
a canard-one that at best meant simply that the matter should depend on whether the 
President was still capable of being our nation's leader. Just as a murder of a private 
enemy, or a President's horrendous engagement in child abuse, might justify 
impeachment, so too might other personal conduct. The question turns on whether 
or not the President has undermined his trust and confidence in the American people. 
One other point follows: If you think that the President should not have been 
impeached because his activities did not undermine his ability to govern, then I urge 
you to think about whether or not the Court may have actually been right in Jones. 
If one year of almost full distraction did not undermine the President's ability to do 
the nation's business, one must question whether a single meager lawsuit could do 
SO.33 . 
B. Executive Privilege and Personal Conduct 
In the recent impeachment hearings and trial, the President stood accused of 
perjury and obstruction of justice. The House Managers claimed they were not 
impeaching the President based on his personal misconduct, but instead on the basis 
of what he did to interfere with the Paula Jones lawsuit and reSUlting criminal 
(No. 95-1853). 
30 See Brief of Petitioner William Jefferson Clinton at 8,Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 
(1997) (No. 95-1853). 
31 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
32 Clinton's Address, supra note 1, at A 14. 
33 There are, however, institutional reasons to think that Jones is wrong, even if this 
particular President may have a unique ability to compartmentalize. Moreover, because 
such suits can be expected to multiply, the issue in Jones was broader than Paula Jones' 
lawsuit. See Amar & Katyal, supra note 9, at 714 n.52. 
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investigation.34 The President's defenders, for their part, characterized the 
accusations as improper because they were based on his personal conduct in having 
an affair with Monica Lewinsky.3$ Hence, both sides assumed that impeachment for 
personal wrongdoing was inappropriate. This assumption was made even though the 
President went before not only his Cabinet, but the American people, and denied 
having a sexual relationship "with that woman, Monica Lewinsky ."36 At that point, 
what exactly was private? 
The President's privacy defense appears more attenuated when we examine his 
invocation of executive privilege. This President has not been shy in invoking the 
privilege at various points to block disclosure of material, including material relating 
to the Travel Office Investigation,37 the inquiry into wrongdoing by former 
Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy,38 a memorandum by the FBI Director that was 
critical of the Clinton Administration's drug control efforts,39 and information on U.S. 
policy towards Haiti.40 President Clinton's decision to invoke it in the Lewinsky 
34 See 145 CONGo REc. E238 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (Closing Argument of Rep. 
Henry 1. ;Hyde, Impeachment Trial). 
Of course it's useful for the defense to misdirect our focus toward what 
everyone concedes are private acts and none of our business, but if you care to 
read the articles of impeachment, you won't find any complaints about private, 
sexual misconduct. You will find charges of perjury and obstruction of justice 
which are public acts and federal crimes, especially when committed by the one 
person duty bound to faithfully execute the laws. Infidelity is private and non-
criminal. . 
Id; see also 145 CONGo REc. S1362 (daily ed. Feb .. 7, 1999) (Closing Argument of Rep. 
Lindsey Graham) ("I would never want my President or your President removed because 
of private sins."). 
3S See 145 CONGo REc. S1704 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1999) (statement of Sen. Nickles): 
The President's defenders have argued that his errors were "private acts" which 
are irrelevant to the constitutional standards of public behavior. But this was 
not about adultery. These charges would be just as valid even if he were never 
married. Let's also consider a few other facts .... The President asserted one 
of his most precious powers, that of executive privilege, to keep government 
employees from cooperating with a federal grand jury .. 
36 See State of the Presidency: People are More Curious About the Sex Scandal than 
the State of the Union, NEWSDAY, Jan. 27, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2656057. 
31 See COMM. ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT, 104TH CONG., 
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND CONGRESS IN THE PROCEEDINGS 
AGAINST JOHN M. QUINN, DAVID WATKINS, AND MATTHEW MOORE AS PART OF THE 
COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION INTO THE WHITE HOUSE TRAVEL OFFICE MA TIER (Comm. 
Print 1996). 
38 See In re Sealed Case, 121 FJd 729 (D.C; Cir. 1997). 
39 See Letter from Janet Reno, United states Attorney General, to President Bill Clinton 
(Sept. 30, 1996) . 
. 40 See Letter from Janet Reno, Uriited States Attorney General, to President Bill Clinton . 
(Sept. 20, 1996). 
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matter, however, was unprecedented. In response to. an Office of Independent 
Counsel (OIC) subpoena of two of the President's advisers, Sydney Blumenthal and 
Bruce Lindsey, the President claimed executive privilege to shield them.41 
Pointedly, unlike many of the claims he advanced at other stages in the litigation, 
the President grounded his assertion of executive privilege for Blumenthal and 
Lindsey not in the fact that the matters were personal, but in the fact that they were 
official.42 Ironically, it was the OIC that claimed that the matters concerned the 
President in his personal affairs, and that executive privilege could not apply.43 
Federal district court judge Norma Holloway Johnson resolved this dispute in two 
steps. First, the court bowed to the OIC' s notion that entirely private matters cannot 
be protected by privilege, stating, "Purely private conversations that did not touch on 
any aspect ofthe President's official duties or relate in some manner to presidential 
decision-making would not properly fall within the executive privilege.'t44 Having 
stated the distinction, the court then proceeded to erase it, noting that ''the President 
does need to address personal matters in the context of his official decisions" and 
labeling as "oversimplified" "the position that nothing the President or his advisors 
could say to each other regarding the grand jury investigation or the Jones litigation 
would relate to the President's official duties.'t4S 
41 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings,S F. Supp. 2d 21,24-25 (D.D.C. 1998), affd in 
part, rev 'd in part sub nom., In Re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
119 S. Ct. 466 (1998). 
42 See id 
43 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings,S F. Supp. 2d at 25. 
Id. 
The White House argues that the communications of Lindsey and Blumenthal 
are presumptively privileged because President Clinton has invoked executive 
privilege. The OIC counters that the communications are not privileged 
because the executive privilege applies only to communications regarding 
official presidential matters and the federal grand jury investigation regarding 
Monica Lewinsky and the Paula Jones litigation are private matters. 
In his Testimony before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, Mr. 
Starr repeated the theme that the President misused executive privilege by invoking the 
privilege for a personal matter: 
May I say very briefly on executive privilege, I do think that it is an abuse of 
a very important constitutional principle for such a special principle, executive 
privilege, which I strongly believe in-and I defend the concept of executive 
privilege-to be invoked with respect to the nonofficial activities of the 
president of the United States. I think it's improper. 
Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States: Hearing 
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Congo 51 (Nov. 19, 1998), available in 
1998 WL 801037 (prepared testimony of Kenneth Starr). 
44 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26. 
45 Id 
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Having found that the Lindsey and Blumenthal material was presumptively 
covered by executive privilege, the court then demolished the President's claim of 
executive privilege. After reviewing the evidence ex parte, Judge Johnson concluded 
that the privilege should be pierced because the material was "directly relevant to the 
issues that are expected to be central to the trial.''''6 Judge Johnson concluded, "In 
sum, the OIC has provided a substantial factual showing to demonstrate its 'specific 
need' for the testimony.''''' The President's claim of privilege here was weak and had 
the appearance of stonewalling. To quote another participant in this Symposium, 
Professor Rozell: 
All evidence to date suggests that Clinton used executive privilege to 
frustrate and delay the investigation .... White House efforts to obstruct 
and delay for the sake of some perceived political advantage cynically 
undermined both the privilege and the principle. Regarding executive 
privilege, Clinton's legacy appears not to be that of a President wlJo 
reestablished this necessary power, but rather, like Nixon before him, as 
one who gave executive privilege a bad name.48 
Perhaps it was to be expected, then, that the OIC' s impeachment referral articulated, 
as one of the eleven charges against him, that .the President misused executive 
privilege. As Mr. Starr told the House: 
In asserting Executive Privilege, the President was plowing headlong into 
the Supreme Court's unanimous decision 24 years ago in United States 
v. Nixon. There, the Supreme Court ruled that Executive Privilege was 
overcome by the need for relevant evidence in criminal proceedings. And 
thus, it came as no surprise that Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson 
rejected President Clinton's effort to use Executive Privilege to prevent 
disclosure of relevant evidence. .... When the President and the 
Administration assert privileges in a context involving the President's 
personal issues ... there is substantial and credible evidence that the 
President has misused the privileges available to his Office. ,,49 
46 Id at 28. 
47 Id at 29. 
48 Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon's Shadow, 
83 MINN. L. REv. 1069, 1124-25 (1999). 
49 Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States: 
Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Congo 51 (Nov. 19, 1998), 
available in 1998 WL 801037 (prepared testimony of Kenneth Starr) (emphasis added). 
Starr continued: 
This point bears emphasis: The administration justified its many privilege 
claims by claiming an interest in protecting the presidency, not the president 
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Furthermore, Starr argued to the House, the misuse of privilege was not a private 
matter, but a public one.so 
In sum, the President's defenders asserted that the matters were personal at one 
time, and claimed them to be official at another. They also asserted at one point that 
the personal activities of the President, if they became the subject of litigation in the 
courts, could be damaging to the President's ability to conductthe nation's business. 
Yet, at another point, they asserted that the President's personal wrongdoing did not 
impact his ability to govern. Whether his activities did have such an impact is best 
decided by our elected officials in the House and Senate. Yet, before putting the 
matter to rest by looking at the Senate's acquittal of President Clinton in February of 
1999, perhaps we may be guided in future impeachments by examining what 
happened after the acquittal of the President. There are those who contend that the 
President lost his ability to recommend legislation or get his agenda through 
Congress. Instead of focusing on such claims, this Essay turns to one of the less 
visible areas of governance: executive privilege. 
Id. 
Id. 
III. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AFTER IMPEACHMENT: F ALNs1 
In September of 1999, following his acquittal by the Senate, President Clinton 
personally. But that justification is dubious for two reasons. First, Presidents 
Carter and Reagan waived all government privileges at the outset of criminal 
investigations in which they were involved. The examples set by those two 
presidents demonstrate that such privilege claims in criminal investigations are 
manifestly unnecessary to protect the presidency. Second, these novel privilege 
claims were quite weak as a matter oflaw. 
And that raises a question: What was it about the Monica Lewinsky matter 
that generated the administration's particularly aggressive approach to 
privileges? The circumstantial evidence suggests an answer: delay. Indeed, 
when this Office sought to have the Supreme Court decide all three privilege 
claims at once this past June, the Administration opposed expedited 
consideration. 
50 See id at 44-45: 
Indeed, the evidence suggests that the President repeatedly tried to thwart the 
legal process in the Jones case and the grand jury investigation. That is not a 
private matter. The evidence further suggests that the President, in the course 
of these efforts, misused his authority and power as President 'and contravened 
his duty to faithfully execute the laws. That, too, is not a private matter .... 
The President and his Administration asserted three different governmental 
privileges to conceal relevant information from the federal grand jury. 
51 FALN is the Spanish acronym for Fuerzas Armada de Liberacion Nacional, the 
Armed Forces of National Liberation. 
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invoked executive privilege once again in shielding infonnation regarding his decision 
to grant executive clemency to several Puerto Rican terrorists. 53 Many commentators 
feared thatthe President's clemency decision was influenced by the First Lady's U.S. 
Senate campaign, and her desire to appeal to the Puerto Rican vote. 54 The House and 
Senate sought infonnation on the clemency decision, and the White House refused to 
tum it over, citing privilege concerns. 55 
There are often valid and strong reasons for a president to invoke executive 
privilege. Executive privilege, which has a pedigree as far back as George 
Washington,s6 serves several important functions. It prevents disclosure of 
infonnation that can subvert crucial military or strategic objectives. It bestows a 
modicum of privacy onto executive branch officials. Most importantly, it ensures 
that the advice the President receives is candid and frank. As the Supreme Court said 
in a case regarding President Nixon's invocation of privilege, "Human experience 
teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper 
candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of 
the decision making process."S7 
All ofthese functions might be implicated by the FALN case. Important material 
relating to the situation in Puerto Rico may be at issue. Privacy concerns could exist. 
Additionally, opening up the pardon process to public inspection could make officials 
much more reluctant to give free and frank advice to the President. There are also 
other concerns in the pardon context that weigh in favor of privilege. People are 
sometimes reluctant to provide exculpatory infonnation to the Pardon Attorney if they 
believe that this infonnation will be made public. Reputations may be ruined and, 
sometimes literally, lives may be lost. As any good prosecutor (or journalist) will 
understand, there is an important need for the President to be able to promise 
confidentiality of sources. What is more, providing information in the F ALN matter 
will open the door to congressional interference in other pardon matters. Just imagine 
the Senate opening up the files on Jonathan Pollard.58 
53 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privilege, Confidentiality, Trust; The Road to a 
Compromise Between the White House and Congress, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1999, at A31, 
available in 1999 WL 23305248. 
54 See Kevin Galvin, Clinton Won't Give Congress Data about Clemency: He Invokes 
Executive Privilege; Critics Say to Aid Wife, OET. NEWS, Sept. 17, 1999, at A3, available 
in 1999 WL 3938601; Dick Morris, Hillary's Self-Inflicted Wounds-Keeping Secrets 
Keeps the Home-Loan and FALN Scandals Alive, N.Y. POST, Sept. 21, 1999, at 43, 
available in 1999 WL 27650490. 
55 See Clinton Won't Reveal All FALN Papers, CHI. SUN-nMES, Sept. 16, 1999, at 3, 
available in 1999 WL 6557053; Jerry Seper, Reno Opposed to Granting Clemency to 16 
Puerto Rican Terrorists: Clinton Sought Release Despite Warning that They Were a 
Threat, WASH. nMES, Oct. 21, 1999, at AI, available in 1999 WL 3096700. 
56 See Rozell, supra note 48, at 1069-70. 
57 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974). 
58 Jonathan Pollard was a former Navy analyst who was convicted of treason and 
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Nevertheless, the President's credibility when it comes to privilege has been put 
in doubt by his earlier invocation ofthe doctrine. Given what he said in the Lewinsky 
matter, it should come as no surprise that the public worries about a coverup. As 
U.S. News and World Report put it: 
President Clinton may have played the executive privilege card one 
time too often. He invoked legal privi leges so many times during I' affaire 
Lewinsky that the public and lawmakers don't buy it anymore----even 
when he may have a valid legal reason. That's just what happened last 
week when he claimed executive privilege to avoid turning over 
documents ... about Clinton's controversial decision to grant clemency 
to 16 members ofFALN, a terrorist Puerto Rican nationalist group .. 
The problem is that Clinton routinely claimed legal privileges last 
year in trying to shield secrets about his affair with Monica Lewinsky 
from Kenneth Starr's grand jury. Consequently, he appears suspect now. 
"Another president making this claim would be given it because 
technically it is right," says Cal Jillson, political science chairman at 
. Southern Methodist University. "But the immediate public reaction to this 
is, 'There he goes again, trying to use executive privilege to cover 
personal wrongdoing or something politically embarrassing. ",59 
These concerns were voiced by several other commentators. The Atlanta Journal 
and Constitution said: 
We agree that he's not constitutionally obliged to provide the details of 
his conversations on the clemency issue to Congress. We'll go along with 
that despite his tarnished record on asserting executive privilege. In federal 
courts in Arkansas and Washington he's tried to withhold information 
regarding Whitewater and Monica Lewinsky. Both courts rejected his 
assertions, and Clinton's claim was dropped on appeal. 
But we are not Congress. We are the American people. And we say 
again: The president owes us an explanation. We're entitled to know what 
merited their release, this slap in the ~ace to law enforcement and the nation's 
victims and survivors of terrorism. '" 
Clinton has denied that his decision to weaken the administration policy 
against negotiating with terrorists had anything to do with Hillary Clinton's 
sentenced to life imprisonment for spying on behalf of Israel. See American Husband, Wife 
Plead Guilty to Spying/or Israel, CHI. TRIB., June 5, 1986, available in 1986 WL 2674200. 
59 Angie Cannon, Clinton Tries on the Privilege Cloak Again: This Time, Maybe It Will 
Hold up Legal/y, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., Sept. 27, 1999, at 25. 
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imminent bid for the U.S. Senate representing New York, home to 1.3 
million Puerto Ricans. Pardon our skepticism.60 
Many in Congress made similar arguments. Representative Dan Burton, one of the 
President's persistent foes, declared: "I hope the President won't try to hide behind 
executive privilege again. The American people have a right to know why President 
Clinton thinks he isjustified in opening the jailhouse door for convicted terrorists.,,61 
The F ALN matter, therefore, is an excellent demonstration ofthe bridge between 
the President's official and unofficial lives. Just as Judge Johnson realized that what 
begins as personal in the White House eventually becomes public-and involves the 
use of the President's staff'2-so too what begins as a defensive tactic in a 
supposedly personal investigation eventually has public ramifications. The 
President's ability to invoke executive privilege in future situations has been 
compromised by his use of it in the Lewinsky matter. 
All presidents begin with a certain limited capital oftrust. They can chose to use 
that capital as they wish, but once the public begins to fear that the capital is being 
60 Clinton Should State Casefor Releasing Terrorists, A TLANT A J. & ATLANTA CONST., 
Oct. 21, 1999, at A22. Others in the media have made similar comments: 
Abuse of executive privilege is an old story with Bill Clinton, who invoked it 
to conceal embarrassing information about the Monica Lewinsky affair and 
former Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy .... Unless a credible explanation for 
pardoning members of a terrorist organization is forthcoming, reasonable 
people can only conclude Clinton once again is using executive privilege to 
conceal misconduct. 
Clinton's Pardons Stir Belief He's Abusing Privilege Power, THE PANT AGRAPH, Sept. 28, 
1999, at A12, available in 1999 WL 16668480. 
Clinton and his lawyers have invoked executive privilege to dodge 
responsibility for L' Affair Lewinsky, Whitewater, the China scandals and 
more .... Last week, that very Justice (sic, again) Department relocated a 
troublesome Waco prosecutor and told FBI agents to stonewall Congress about 
Clinton'S decision to free 11 terrorists belonging to the Puerto Rican nationalist 
group FALN. 
Tony Snow, Clinton's Assault on Our Souls, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 23, 
1999, at 23, available in 1999 WL 24201214. 
61 Dan Burton, Clemency Agreement Won't Stop Inquiry, Federal Document Clearing 
House, Sept. 7, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2226541; see also 145 CONGo REC. H8878 
(daily ed. Sept. 28, 1999) (statement of Rep. Royce) ("By claiming executive privilege, he 
is telling the American people that it is none of their business. This is not right. It is the 
business of the American people."); 145 CONGo REc. H8560 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1999) 
(statement of Rep. Pitts); 145 CONGo REc. S11085 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1999) (statement of 
Sen. Gregg); 145 CONGo REc. S10809 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch) 
("The White House and the Justice Department are hiding behind their tired, old ploy of 
'studying' whether to assert executive privilege. "); 145 CONGo REc. at S 10812-13 (daily ed. 
Sept. 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. Gregg). 
62 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26 (1998). 
HeinOnline -- 8 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J.  691 1999-2000
2000] THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIVES OF PRESIDENTS 691 
spent to shield wrongdoing, they worry. Government secrecy is something to be 
feared greatly in a democracy. At times, it serves important functions. Yet all 
presidents risk undermining their ability to wield executive privilege in proper 
situations when they use it in improper ones. This is the lesson that President Nixon 
taught us, and why Presidents since Nixon-with the notable exception of President 
Clinton-have been so reluctant to use executive privilege.62 
Another point, which is more helpful to President Clinton, follows from the 
notion of limited capital: We must beware of criticizing a given use of executive 
privilege because a President earlier in time waived it in what looked like similar 
circumstances. A President may waive secrecy in one circumstance not out of 
principle, but because he may want to preserve his capital of tru~t to shield future 
secrets. Or he may waive secrecy because that capital has been depleted because of 
earlier, entirely correct, assertions of privilege. 
Many commentators, nevertheless, criticized President Clinton's F ALN privilege 
claim on the ground that President Ford turned over all evidence about a different 
pardon, namely, Ford's pardon of President Nixon.63 Yet, given the political reality 
of that unique situation, it had to be difficult for Ford to have done anything else. 
Ford's decision was necessitated by the diminished capital of trust that Nixon 
engendered, even ifthere were valid arguments for secrecy. Other situations present 
different mixes offacts, dissimilar issues oftrust, and varying grounds for secrecy. 
Furthermore, it is quite difficult to evaluate whether one situation is "like" another, 
particularly when material remains secret. It is not impossible to evaluate such 
claims; however, caution is warranted in trying to do so. 
Even if drawing precise analogies is possible, we should question whether we 
actually want a system of stare decisis for executive privilege. The oft-cited reasons 
for adhering to precedent in the judicial context, such as concerns about horizontal 
equity,64 respect for the past,6S and stability66 are either not applicable or not as 
applicable as they are in the judicial setting. Moreover, the cost is rather high: If 
presidents have to worry that their waivers will bind not only the matter in front of 
62 See Rozell, supra note 48, at 1071 (stating that "President Richard M. Nixon gave 
executive privilege a bad name, however, when he invoked these legitimate defenses in a 
circumstance where clearly the President was trying to conceal White House wrongdoing" 
and that an "unfortunate consequence of this tum of events has been the attempts by 
Nixon's successors to conceal even their use of executive privilege .... Presidents Ford and 
Carter generally avoided using executive privilege"). 
63 See Jonathan Turley, Nothing Bars Questioning President's Bad Ideas, L.A. nMES, 
Sept. 27, 1999, at B7; Peter J. Wallison, Executive Privilege vs. Our Right to Know, N.Y. 
nMES, Sept. 22,1999, at 27. 
64 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 595-97 (1987). 
6S See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE LJ. 1029, 1066 (1990). 
66 See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. 
L. REV. 723, 748-56 (1988). 
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them, but future presidents in future matters, then they will be much more reluctant 
to waive privilege in a given situation. They will fear that their decision to forgo a 
claim of privilege will tie the hands of another President in some other circumstance, 
and weaken presidential power. Or, more cynically, they will be tempted to invoke 
privilege frequently on the ground that they are trying to vindicate the principle of 
executive privilege for the future, and not out of secrecy concerns in the present. AIl 
of this counsels against holding presidents to the same "standard" as the one used by 
their predecessors in determining whether to waive privilege. 
CONCLUSION 
The argument in the above pages, that the public/private distinction is of little 
importance when it comes to the President, is not one in favor ofthe impeachment of 
President Clinton. Rather, it is one addressed to the future-to trying to help us 
understand what, if anything, to make of claims about what is personal and offlimits 
when it comes to the President. The public/private distinction was used on both sides 
ofthe impeachment debate in ways that were inconsistent and wrong. It is time to put 
that distraction, too, behind us. 
